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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
The Illinois Proposal to Confine Sexually Dangerous Persons
Psychiatrists believe that a substantial percentage of sex crimes are
committed by persons technically termed "psychopathic personalities"
or, more particularly, "sexual psychopaths." 1 Case histories of such
persons indicate a lifelong tendency not to conform to the customs of
the group ;2 psychopaths are prone to consistently misbehave, and dem-
onstrate an habitual failure to learn from experience. 3 Psychopathic
personalities have been defined as persons suffering from a "mental
instability not amounting to a certifiable mental disease or deficiency,
but characterized by emotional dullness or instability, together with a
lack of perseverance, persistent failure to profit by experience, and
persistent lack of ordinary prudence, often resulting in. . . sexual excess
.. or delinquency.' '4
To meet the menace of the sex crime and the sexual psychopath, seven
states have passed laws which permit the confinement of persons judged
sexually dangerous to the community. 5 Illinois passed the first valid
legislation of this type in 1938, providing for the detention and commit-
ment of criminal sexual psychopathic persons.6 This statute defines such
persons as individuals suffering for at least one year from a mental dis-
order, not insane or feebleminded, coupled with criminal propensities
toward the commission of sex offenses.7 Under this act, the state's attor-
ney or attorney general may file a petition in court if he believes that
any person charged with a criminal offense is a criminal sexual psycho-
pathic person.8  Upon the filing of this petition, the court appoints two
psychiatrists to examine the individual to find out whether he is crim-
inally sexually psychopathic. 9 Before the criminal offense is tried, a
hearing on the petition is held before a jury. At this hearing, evidence
of the commission of other crimes by that person may be introduced.
If the jury finds that the person is a criminal sexual psychopath, the
1 For a general discussion of the concept of the psychopathic personality, see Arieff
and Rotman, Psychopathic Personality (1948) 39 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 158. The
authors state that there is no classification in psychiatry more misused than the term
psychopathic personality. In fact, they state that the term has "become the waste-
basket of psychiatry, serving as a cover-all for all persons who indulge in anti-social
conduct. "1
2 A summary of the symptoms of a psychopathic personality is made in Hovey,
Behavior Characteristics of Anti-Social Recidivists (1942) 32 J. Crim. L. & Crim-
inology 636.
3 An excellent connent in 96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 872 (1948) points out that: "In
the ordinary affairs of life, the behavior of the 'normal' man may be influenced by
the fact that penalties are liable to be inflicted if anti-social tendencies are indulged.
In the majority of psychopathic personalities, the penalty may be clearly appraised,
but outweighed or obscured by the urgency of the desire to commit the illegal act.''
4 Henderson and Gillespie, Textbook of Psychiatry (1936). For a substantially
similar definition phrased in more technical medical language, see Noyes, Modern
Clinical Psychiatry (1940) 504.
5 Legislation directed at the sexual psychopath is in effect in Illinois, Michigan,
Minnesota, California, Massachusetts and Ohio.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38 §§820-825.
7 fl. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38 §820.
8 Jurisdiction is vested in the Circuit courts outside of Cook County, the Criminal
Court of Cook County, the City Courts, the County Courts, the Municipal Court of
Chicago and other municipal courts in the state under Section 821 of the 1938 Act.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38 §823 provides that a "IQualified psychiatrist within
the meaning of this section is a reputable physician licensed to practice in Illinois,
and who has exclusively limited his professional practice to.the diagnosis and treat-
ment of mental and nervous disorders for a period of not less than five years."
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court then commits such person to the Department of Public Safety, with
directions to confine the person in specified state institutions until he
recovers from such psychopathy. At any time after commitment, the
person may by written application have a jury hearing to determine
whether he has recovered.' 0 If the jury finds that he has recovered, he
is then committed to the custody of the sheriff pending trial for the
criminal offense charged against him. If the jury finds that he has not
recovered, he is returned for further custody to the Department of
Public Safety.
Ten years' experience with the 1938 act has indicated serious difficul-
ties in its administration. The gravest defect is that the definition section
of the Act limits its coverage to persons charged with crime and having
a mental disorder for over a year prior to any action under the act;
furthermore, the prosecutor must prove that the alleged psychopath has
criminal propensities toward the commission of sex crimes. As a result
of these stringent requirements, the 1938 act has been used sparingly.
Only sixteen persons have been confined under the statute in the ten
year period since its passage.
Seeking to remedy the administrative difficulties presented by enforce-
ment of the 1938 statute, the Committee on Criminal Law of the Chicago
Bar Association has proposed a new law to deal with sexually-dangerous
persons. This new proposal contains six major changes aimed at re-
moving the present shortcomings by: eliminating the necessity of a
criminal charge to bring the individual within the scope of the Act;
expanding the definition of persons intended to be embraced by the Act;
sending persons committed under the act to the Department of Public
Welfare rather than the Department of Public Safety; introducing the
technique of a conditional release with continuing supervision by the
Court over the individual for one to three years; providing additional
procedural safeguards for the individual at the hearings; authorizing
the court to compel an individual to submit to psychiatric examination.
Criminal Charge Not Prerequisite to Hearing Regarding
Sexually Dangerousness
Under the new Illinois proposal, a person need not be charged with a
criminal offense to authorize a hearing regarding his mental condition.
If the attorney general or state's attorney believes that good cause exists
for a judicial determination as to whether or not a person is sexually
dangerous, he is authorized to file a petition with.the clerk of a court
having jurisdiction under the Act." The petition follows the pattern
of the present statute in that it would state why the person is considered
sexually dangerous and would request the. court to order a psychiatric
examination of the individual. Only the state's attorney or the attorney
general can file such a petition. If the judge believes that the petition
is correct, he would then order an examination of the individual by
two qualified psychiatrists i2 and set a date for the hearing. The psychi-
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38 §825 provides that th6 court is to set a date for the
hearing within ten days after such a written application is fled.
11 Jurisdiction under the new proposal is vested in the same courts as in the 1938
Act except that the Juvenile Court of Cook County is also given the power to hold
hearings concerning a minor's sexual irresponsibility.
12 Qualifications for examining psychiatrists in the new bill are identical to those
in the present statute. However, various other qualifications have been suggested, e.g.,
1949]
GCIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
atrists would then be required to submit written reports of their examina-
tion before the hearing.
There are three different ways in which a person would come under
the proposed law: 1) Whenever the attorney general or state's attorney
files a petition as outlined above; 2) whenever the judge in a criminal
proceeding believes the defendant to be sexually dangerous, he may order
the hearing and examination of that person on the court's own motion;
3) whenever a defendant has been adjudged guilty of either a crime
against nature, rape, or crime against children, and a petition has not
yet been filed for a hearing, the court is then ordered not to impose
sentence on the defendant until after a hearing is held and a determina-
tion is made as to whether the defendant is a sexually dangerous person.
Thus, under the new proposal, there would be a mandatory hearing before
sentence but after conviction of the more serious sex crimes, and discre-
tionary hearings when the state's attorney, attorney general or a crim-
inal court judge believes that a hearing should be held.
New Definition of Sexually Dangerous Person
The second important change in the new proposal is related to the
expansion of the definition of a sexually dangerous person. The term
"sexually-dangerous person" according to the proposed act shall mean
any person evidencing one or more of the following: "1) Emotional
instability in sexually-motivated behavior so as to render him dangerous
to others; 2) uncontrolled impulses in sexually-motivated behavior such
as to render him dangerous to others; 3) a lack of customary standards
of judgment in sexually-motivated behavior such as to render him dan-
gerous to others; 4) a failure to appreciate the consequences of his
sexually-motivated behavior such as to render him dangerous to others."
Thus, the new definition eliminates the one year duration and criminal
propensities requirements of the present statute. It is also noteworthy
that the proposed definition specifically omits the terms "criminal" and
"psychopath."
The proposed definition is modeled in large part upon the definition
found in the present Minnesota statute.13  It is readily apparent-that
this definition lacks precision of statement and is subject to attack on
that ground. However, judicial acceptance of this definition is found
in State ex rel Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County,14 in which
a person committed to state care under the Minnesota statute appealed
to the United States Supreme Court on the grounds of vagueness in
the definition. The Supreme Court of Minnesota had held that the
definition was "intended to include those persons who by an habitual
course of misconduct in sexual matters have evidenced an utter lack
of power to control their sexual impulses. '15  The Minnesota court went
on to decide that it would be unreasonable to apply this definition to
every person committing any sexual misconduct, but would limit its
membership in the American Board of Neurology and Psychiatry. Such a statutory
definition of a doctor's qualifications would insure the appointment of competent
examiners and also reduce the chances of the judge's appointments on patronage
motives. The best solution appears to be that of an official court clinic composed of
specialists on sex offenders.
13 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §§526.09-526.11.
14 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
15 State ex rel. Charles Edwin Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205
Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939).
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application to those persons lacking the power to control their sexual
desires. The Supreme Court of the United States held that it was
bound by the construction of the statute in the Minnesota Court.
As so construed, the Supreme Court held that this definition of a sexual
psychopath was sufficiently definite to be upheld.16 In the light of the
Pearson decision, 17 it therefore seems clear that the definition in the
proposed bill in Illinois is free from constitutional inhibitions.'8
The new definition is further significant in that the entire tenor of
the new proposal is couched in terms of the civil nature of the proceed-
ings. In the proposed act, the individual is consistently referred to as a
"patient," and the new statute is to be clearly placed in the Civil and
not in the Criminal Code. This emphasis is undoubtedly based on the
experience of the Michigan legislators who wrote a similar sexual psycho-
pathic statute, incorporated it into the Michigan Criminal Code, and saw
it declared unconstitutional by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v.
Frontzak.19 The Michigan statute of 1937 was the first of its type.2 0 The
Frontzak decision held the statute unconstitutional because it did not
observe certain rights guaranteed to the accused in a criminal trial.2 ' It
therefore seems apparent that this new proposal emphasizes the civil
nature of the action and hearing to avoid the pitfalls of the Michigan
experience, as well as to escape the rigidity of criminal proceedings. 22
The theory of the civil rather than criminal classification of the statute
rests on an analogy to insanity inquests and lunacy hearings. 23 Such
inquests have long been treated as civil suits,2 4 even though an indi-
vidual's liberty may be restrained as a result of the inquiry. Some
16 Note (1941) 32 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 196, discusses the Pearson doctrine
and also the general legal problems involved in dealing with the sexually irresponsible.
17 Even though the definition in the new proposal has received judicial acceptance,
it is to be noted that such acceptance has been conditioned upon a rather limited con-
struction of that definition. The Massachusetts legislature sought to avoid the danger
of constitutional obstacles in the courts by originally incorporating the Minnesota
court's construction of the statutory language. Thus the Massachusetts bill defines a
psychopathic personality as a person evidencing "an habitual course of misconduct
in sexual matters evidencing an utter lack of power to control sexual impulses and
likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil." I Mass. Ann. Laws
(Supp. 1947) c. 123(a).
18 The Supreme Court of the United States appears even more definitely committed
now to the principle of following state construction of state statutes. Cf. Musser et
al. v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
19 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534 (1938).
20 Mich. Pub. Act 1937, No. 196.
21 The Michigan Supreme Court placed emphasis on the fact that the statute was
contained in the criminal procedure code and that the indefinite confinement was
regarded as an added penalty for crime. The precise ground of unconstitutionality
was that the individual was deprived of the right to jury trial of a jury from the
vicinage.
22 As a result of the Frontczak decision, a new statute was passed in Michigan. The
present Michigan law (Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §§28.967(1)-28.967(9) is very
similar to the Illinois proposal, with the important difference of making commitment
as a psychopath a complete defense to a criminal charge. Its constitutionality was
tested and upheld in People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W. (2d) 18 (1942).
23 See Comment (1947) 56 Yale L.J. 1178 for a general discussion of the legal and
medical considerations involved in committing the mentally ill.
24 People v. Janek, 287 Mich. 563, 283 N.W. 689 (1939). "The sanity proceeding
... is an inquiry in the nature of an inquest, humanely provided for safeguarding the
rights of an accused mentally incapable of advising with counsel... It is not a trial
placing a defendant in jeopardy, but a collateral inquiry to preserve him from the
jeopardy of a trial while insane."
1949]
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
courts have characterized such hearings as "special proceedings; '"25 all
courts have uniformly agreed that this type of judicial action is not a
criminal trial. Main reliance for this position is based on the fact that
no punishment is intended for the individual; instead, the courts have
reasoned that the state is merely extending its care and custody to
afflicted persons who are dangerous to themselves and the community.
2 6
Treatment v. Incarceration
The third major change in the new proposal is that persons who are
committed under the proposed act will be sent to the Department of
Public Welfare rather than to the Department of Public Safety. At
present, the Department of Public Safety has control over such persons.
The Department of Public Safety contains the state law enforcement
agencies, the prison administrations, the state police, and is generally
concerned with criminal problems. The Department of Public Welfare,
on the other hand, supervises the 25 state welfare institutions and mental
hospitals.2 7 The change is proposed as a result of a newer approach of
dealing with such people as a medical problem. 28 All of the proceedings
for commitment and release have been chosen with the governing
thought that treatment is to be preferred over punishment or mere incar-
ceration.29 It is additionally desirable that persons deemed dangerous
be confined in mental institutions because such persons have usually
created difficult problems in prison administration. 30
Use of Conditional Release
The fourth major change made by the new proposal is the provision
for the conditional release of persons who have been adjudged no longer
sexually dangerous. The device of the interlocutory order has been
employed to provide continuing court supervision considered necessary
to assure a safe return of the person to society. The period of condi-
tional release is specified to be not less than one year and not more than
25 In re Breese, 82 Iowa 573, 48 N.W. 991 (1891); In re Cook, 218 N.C. 384, 11
S.E. (2d) 142 (1940).
26 County of Black Hawk v. Springer, 58 Iowa 417, 10 N.W. 791 (1881). Compare
this with the dissent of Butzel, J. in People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534
(1938): "Such proceedings [insanity hearings] do not involve trials for crime, but
are merely inquests. The mental and physical disorders with which sex degenerates are
afflicted require their segregation and hospitalization just as much as similar treat-
ment is required for insane persons and those afflicted with communicable diseases.
To effect such segregation, no more than an inquest ... is required. The person is not
being committed as punishment for a crime, and the proceedings do not constitute a
criminal trial." See also People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 NE. (2d) 736 (1949),
for a similar argument by the Illinois court in interpreting the present Criminal
Sexual Psychopath Statute.
27 The Illinois Blue Book for 1947-48 states that the Department of Public Welfare
was responsible for care and treatment of 45,000 wards in 1947. Compare Wiltrakis,
Your Mental Hospitals-Overcrowding (March 1949) The Welfare Bulletin (official
publication of the Illinois Department of Public Welfare). The author states that
there are now 43,000 patients in Illinois state mental institutions in space deemed
adequate for 28,000 patients.
28 Wall and Wylie, Institutional and Post-Institutional Treatment of the Sex
Offender (1948), 2 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 47, discusses some special problems presented
by the sex offender in the typical mental institution.
29 See Dession, Psychiatry and the Conditioning of Criminal Justice (1938) 47
Yale L.J. 319.
30 Karpmann, Sex Life in Prison (1948) 38 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 475.
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three years. During this period, the court is directed to retain jurisdic-
tion of the patient and may from time to time modify the conditions and
terms of the order of conditional discharge. If the patient breaches any
of these conditions, the court may order him returned to the Department
of Public Welfare for further care and treatment. Upon a showing
of satisfactory termination of the conditional release, the court then
enters a final judgment that the person is no longer sexually dangerous
to society. If the patient had been adjudged guilty of any crime imme-
diately before commitment under this act, upon his conditional dis-
charge the state's attorney is ordered to bring him before the court
where he was convicted for sentencing or other disposition. The new
bill follows the 1938 Act in stating that any determination that a person
is a sexually dangerous person shall not constitute a defense to any
criminal charge. However, the new bill does authorize the court to
consider the period of time spent in custody of the Department of
Welfare in imposing sentence for the crime.
There has been considerable controversy in sex offender legislation on
the issue of the ultimate criminal responsibility of the individual com-
mitted to a state institution as a sexual psychopath. If the individual
has been convicted of a sex crime immediately prior to his commitment
as a psychopathic personality, or if he faces conviction as soon as he is
released from the mental hospital, there is little incentive for him to
reform under treatment knowing that he will start a prison term imme-
diately upon his release. On the other hand, the courts and psychiatrists
have consistently regarded such individuals as legally sane, thereby
holding them legally accountable for their crimes. The new proposal's
grant of discretion to the trial judge to consider the time spent in con-
finement when setting the sentence for past convictions is a compromise
solution. Undoubtedly, the drafters intend that the courts should, in
their consideration of time spent in confinement, give minimum or even
suspended sentences to the individual who has spent years in mental
institutions. Michigan has seen fit to go all the way in regarding
commitment as a psychopath as a complete defense to the crime of which
the individual was accused at the time of filing the petition. On the
other hand, most states have agreed with the Illinois drafters that mere
commitment is not a sufficient defense to criminal prosecution. The
proposal's specific grant of discretion to the trial judge represents an
attempt at compromise between these two conflicting attitudes.8 1
Procedural Safeguards
The fifth significant alteration made in the new proposal concerns
additional procedural safeguards afforded to the individual at the hear-
ing. Under the proposed act, the person alleged to be sexually dan-
gerous may be represented by counsel,3 2 and no hearing is to be held
81 The Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Massachusetts statutes specifically provide
that commitment as a sexually-dangerous person shall not constitute a defense to
criminal charges. The California statute suspends criminal proceedings after com-
mitment. The Ohio statute represents a rather unique compromise device; the indi-
vidual is sent to a penal institution after his release from the mental hospital until
the total period of confinement equals the applicable criminal sentence.
32 The 1938 Act makes no such express provision. Under the new proposal, the court




except in his presence."3 He may demand a jury of six persons and
may-summon witnesses in his own behalf. The two psychiatrists also
serve as witnesses, and they are subject to cross-examination by the
person alleged to be dangerous. On the problem of jury trial, it is
important to note that the 1938 act makes jury trial mandatory at the
hearing,34 while the new proposal makes use of a jury merely permissive,
providing that the defendant can have a jury if he so desires. This
trend toward a permissive use of the jury is also found in the Cali-
fornia,3 5 Michigan, 6 and Wisconsin 37 statutes, while in Massachusetts 38
the use of a jury is discretionary with the court. Minnesota3 9 and Ohio40
make no provisions whatsoever for jury participation at the hearings.
Any legislative attempt to deal with a sexually dangerous person must
ultimately rest on a delicate balance of the interest of the protection of
society with the essential constitutional rights of the individual. A law
allowing confinement of a person without that person's commission of
a crime is subject to serious and vicious abuse. To meet these inherent
dangers, the new proposal provides at least four substantial procedural
safeguards to the individual. First, individuals are protected against
blackmail and harassment by the fact that only the state's attorney, the
attorney general, and in some cases a criminal court judge can institute
proceedings under the act.4 1 Second, further protection is offered the
individual in that the judge must pass upon the sufficiency of the peti-
tion prepared by the state's attorney or the attorney general. If the
judge believes that there is no good reason for a hearing, he can simply
dismiss the petition at that point. Third, the procedural safeguards
mentioned above are now made available to the individual at hearing:
the rights to counsel, jury, and to summon and cross-examine witnesses
are now made expressly available to the person alleged to be dangerous.
Fourth, additional protection is provided in the fact that the judge may
set aside the verdict of the jury as in other civil proceedings.
The Problem of Self-Incrimination
The last significant change made in the new proposal is the specific
provision giving the court power to compel the individual to submit to a
psychiatric examination. Under the present act, there is a serious prob-
lem presented if the individual protests that the information elicited by
such examination would tend to incriminate him and therefore refuses
to be examined or answer questions. It is to be remembered that a
determination that a person is dangerous is not a defense to criminal
33 The proposal allows evidence of the commission of any past crimes by the
alleged psychopath at the hearing if it is deemed "relevant." This provision is a
narrower one than the 1938 act which broadly permits the introduction of evidence
-of the commission of any number of crimes. The language of the new proposal implies
that such evidence must be limited to related sex offenses.
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, §824.
35 Calif. Penal Code (Deering Supp. 1945) §6102.
86 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1947 Supp.) §§28.967()-28.967(9).
37 Wis. Laws (1942) c. 459.
38 Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1947) c. 123(a).
39 Minn. Stat. Ann- §§526.09-526.11.
40 Ohio Gen. Code (1947 Supp.) §§13451-19--13451-23.
41 The California statute permits the petition and affidavits to be made by any
person. The other state statutes all provide for initiation of proceedings by either
the district attorney, state's attorney, attorney general, or the court after conviction
but before sentence of specified sex offenses.
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prosecution for past sex offenses. Thus, the individual may argue that
his answers to the questions of the psychiatrists could be used against
him in subsequent criminal proceedings, thereby violating his privilege
against self-incrimination.
This problem of self-incrimination was presented to the Illinois
Supreme Court in January, 1949, in People v. Redlic. 42  The case was
decided on other grounds, 4 3 however, and the court did not discuss the
merits of the defendant's contentions in regard to violation of his priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. The precise issue of the court's power
to order a defendant to submit to psychiatric examination was left un-
answered. This issue is clearly one of the most difficult constitutional
issues raised under the proposal. Analyzing the privilege against self-
incrimination in terms of its history and policy, it becomes clear that the
privilege originated to protect individuals from testimonial compulsion
through torture and inquisition methods.44 Dean Wigmore has sug-
gested that the 17th and 18th century's reverential attitude toward the
privilege as a bulwark of liberty is seldom found in the more recent
opinions. 45 The privilege should now be weighed in terms of the detri-
ment to the individual against the safe and efficient administration of
justice.46
It seems clear that oral conversation is'almost essential for a psychi-
atrist to form a sound opinion of the individual's mental condition. Two
distinct problems are raised as a result of this oral examination. First,
does the privilege apply to information which would aid in determining
whether the individual is a sexually-dangerous person?' 7 Second, does
the privilege apply to information the individual is compelled to disclose
which would lead to the discovery of his commission of past sex crimes?
The two problems will be considered separately.
It may well be argued that the privilege does not apply to the actual
psychiatric interview to determine whether or not the individual is a
sexually dangerous person. Since the whole purpose of the legislation
is to extend the legal concept of insanity to include those persons who
42 People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E. (2d) 736 (1949).
43 In the Bedlich case, the defendant refused to submit to examination even after
the court had entered a specific order directing him to answer the psychiatrist's ques-
tions. The trial court found him guilty of contempt of this order and sentenced him
to confinement until he complied with the court order. The defendant was then tried
on the original indictment for the crime against nature; he was found guilty and
sentenced to the penitentiary. The case came to the Illinois Supreme Court on his
appeal from the contempt finding. The Supreme Court decided that since the defend-
ant had already been convicted on the original charge, the purpose of the Sexual
Psychopath Statute had been frustrated, since this purpose was to provide the de-
fendant with a prior determination of his mental condition before going to trial on
the merits of the indictment. The court therefore concluded that the contempt order
had lost its vitality through the defendant's subsequent trial and conviction; con-
sequently the defendant 's appeal was actually from a non-effective order, and was
dismissed.
44 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §§2250, 2251.
45 For a spirited argument recommending the abolition of the privilege against
self-incrimination, see Bird, Our Constitutional Protection of Guilt (1941), 25 J. of
Am. Jud. Soc. 18.
46 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §2251.
47 See Inbau, Self-Incrimination-What Can an Accused Be Compelled to Do?
(1937) 28 T. Cri. L. & Criminology 261, 282 for a discussion of the related problem
of the application of the privilege against self-incrimination to psychiatric examina-
tions of an accussed who has pleaded insanity as a defense to the charges against
him. The author concludes that the privilege has "no application to an inquiry as to
his (the accused) mental responsibility at the time the act was committed."
194]
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are sexually dangerous to society, a comparison with the procedure of
sanity inquests becomes relevant. The recently revised Illinois Mental
Health Act4 8 specifically provides in Section 6(1) that the "Court shall
have the power and authority to compel the person alleged to be mentally
ill or in need of mental treatment to submit to examination by the
physician so appointed by the court." This provision has never been
attacked by any persons whose sanity was in question. No one has
argued so far that this provision is violative of the privilege against
self-incrimination in insanity hearings. Keeping in mind that the pro-
posed bill is a civil action, that the resulting confinement is for purposes
of treatment and cure as contrasted with lenalties and forfeitures, it is
submitted that the individual's claims of self-incrimination, with respect
to a determination of whether or not he is sexually dangerous, have no
sound justification under the new proposal. The legislature and the
courts have seen fit to compel a person to submit to mental examination
when his sanity was in issue; a logical extension of the same principle
would require that a person alleged to be sexually dangerous to the com-
munity should be likewise ordered to submit to psychiatric examination.
However, the other question-whether or not the privilege applies to
any specific facts the defendant is compelled to disclose which might lead
to the discovery of his commission of past crimes-is a much more diffi-
cult problem. It is to be remembered that the privilege against self-
incrimination extends to any facts which may "tend to incriminate" a
person.49 By questioning an individual, the psychiatrist might uncover
evidence of prior criminal offenses. This information might validly be
used by the psychiatrist in forming his opinion of the person's sexual
stability; however, in the hands of the state's attorney or another prose-
cutor, it might easily lead t the conviction of the individual for any
past crimes he may have committed. Thus, the privilege against self-
incrimination seems to apply squarely, since the information the person
is ordered to disclose might well tend to incriminate him for such past
crimes.
Several possibilities are suggested here to meet this constitutional
problem. One approach would be to offer the individual immunity from
subsequent criminal prosecution on account of any acts or information
which he is compelled to disclose to the examiners after he has claimed
the privilege. This provision would certainly be adequate in protecting
the individual. At the same time it would permit the psychiatrists to
obtain sufficient information upon which to make a useful report to the
court. However, this suggestion is subject to criticism on the grounds
that it would discourage the state's attorney from employing the act
at all if there were any chance of detriment to later criminal proceedings
against the individual. The immunity waiver approach therefore appears
heavily weighted in favor of the individual as opposed to the interest of
the community in his future criminal liability. Furthermore, a broad
grant of immunity would encourage sex-offenders to confess all their
past offenses during their psychiatric examination, thus insuring them-
selves immunity from subsequent prosecution.
Another approach rests on the method of examination by the psychi-
atrists. If the examiners feel that they could obtain sufficient informa-
tion about the sex offender's mental condition without requiring him
481;1. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 91'A, §§1-16.
49 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §§2260, 2261.
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to disclose specific names, dates, and places, they could phrase their ques-
tions in general, non-incriminating terms. This approach would satisfy
the policy of the privilege in that it would require the police and prose-
cution to make their own independent search for the facts necessary to
establish the individual's criminal conviction. It would also be fair
to the individual since any information he discloses would not be used
against him in subsequent criminal proceedings.
A third technique which might be employed to counter the application
of the privilege would be the use of an explicit provision in the statute
ordering the psychiatrist not to turn over any specific data or facts
obtained in the interview to the prosecution. As long as the prosecutors
are denied access to such incriminating data, the policy of the privilege
would be satisfied. These alternatives ° are suggested here to counter
the individual's arguments that his privilege against self-incrimination
would apply to proceedings under the new proposal. The self-incrimina-
tion argument poses the most difficult constitutional problem of the bill;
it is clearly a problem which the courts will have to answer if the pro-
posal becomes the law.51
The six changes heretofore outlined represent the most significant
features of the new proposal. In addition to the main bill, several com-
panion bills have also been suggested. One proposes to conform the
Illinois Penitentiary Act to the theory of the new proposal by providing
that a convict confined for certain specified crimes cannot be released
either upon expiration of his sentenc6 or on parole until an examination
is made to determine whether he is mentally ill, feeble-minded, or sexu-
ally dangerous. If he is determined to be sexually dangerous, the court
may order him transferred to the Department of Public Welfare for
treatment and care. Another companion bill seeks to extend the same
general principles to proceedings involving delinquent children. 52
Some Alternative Proposals
Although there has been considerable popular support for specialized
sex-offender legislation, the movement is not lacking in respectable
50 Another alternative is that of a Wisconsin statute, Wis. Stat. (1947) §357.12(2),
providing that 9no testimony regarding the mental condition of the accused shall be
received from witnesses summoned by the accused until the expert witnesses sum-
moned by the prosecution have been given an opportunity to examine and observe the
accused if such opportunity shall have been seasonably demanded." This statute has
expressly been held constitutional by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jessner v.
State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930). In effect, this technique penalizes the
individual who refuses to submit to examination by making any of his own support-
ing evidence inadmissible. Its principal defect is that if a person refuses to be exam-
ined, he can effectively throw an administrative bottleneck into the entire proceeding
since not only his own evidence but also that of the state's would be excluded from
the hearing; it would thus actually defeat the purpose of the proposed bill in securing
expert opinion as to the person's sexual responsibility.
51 A group of related cases throws some light on this problem. These are decisions
which have rejected the defendant's contention of privilego to exclude evidence ob-
tained by psychiatric examination when the defendant himself has introduced the
defense of insanity. State v. Coleman, 96 W.Ya. 544, 123 S.E. 580 (1924); State v.
Chandler, 126 S.C. 149, 119 S.E. 774 (1923); Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So.
547 (1926). Another related question is the application of the privilege against self-
incrimination to physcal examinations of the defendant. For a collection of cases on
this question, see Note (1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 487.
52 A third bill seeks to exclude time spent in confinement as a sexually dangerous
person from the Sfatute of Limitations on criminal-prosecutions.
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critics. Criticism has been levied at such statutes from legal,53 medical,
and lay sources. These critics have offered alternative proposals to
meet the problem of the sex offender.
One group of prominent psychiatrists"4 recommends a present Penn-
sylvania statute55 as an excellent model for other states to follow. This
Pennsylvania statute, the Greenstein Act, provides that upon conviction
of any offense, a defendant may be mentally examined; as a result of
this examination, if the trial judge feels that it will better serve' the
policy of the statute to confine the defendant in a state mental hospital
rather than in a prison, the judge may order the defendant committed
to a state mental institution in lieu of a prison sentence. The defendant
may then be confined indefinitely until cured. This group of psychi-
atrists prefers the Pennsylvania approach for its simplicity and its
acknowledgment that a diagnosis of a mental disorder is a defense to a
criminal charge.
Another group of critics 56 emphasize the position taken by some
psychiatrists that psychopathic personalities are incurable; these critics
therefore recommend a wider use of the indeterminate sentence in con-
fining sex criminals in the prisons, with life sentences for those deemed
hopeless cases. This group advocates the establishment of research
facilities to investigate possible cures for the psychopath, but in the
meantime to keep such persons permanently confined, pending the dis-
covery of more reliable techniques of psychotherapy.
Conclusion
Pervading the entire new proposal is a recognition of the modern view
that the sex offender is a special type of criminal, demanding special
consideration and attention. 57 Sexual psychopaths are invariably
recidivists who habitually fail to learn from experience. 58 Statistics of
sex crimes have reached appalling totals. It has been reported that rape
occurs in the United States every 45 minutes of every day,59 and it has
been estimated that 40,000 sex crimes are committed annually in this
country.60 Gradually, the concept of special treatment for this special
problem has won acceptance in the legislatures and the courts. The
realization has deepened that sex crimes are not ordinary crimes, and
that sex offenders are not ordinary criminals with ordinary motives.6 1
53 See Stewart, Concerning Proposed Legislation for the Commitment of Sex
Offenders (1938), 3 John Marshall L. Q. 407.
54 Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Report of Committee on Forensic
Psychiatry, Circular Letter 131, Feb. 12, 1949.
55 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon 1948 Supp.) §§1153-1156.
56 See Editorial, Chicago Tribune, November 23, 1948.
57 See Note (1948) 39 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 485.
581Hughes, The Minnesota "ISxual Irresponsibiles Law" (1940) 25 Mental
Hygiene 76.
59 This report was made by Harris, A New Report on Sex Crimes, Coronet, October,
1947, based on statistics in the United States for the seven month period Aug. 1946
to March 1947.
60 This figure was listed in another popular magazine, The Saturday Evening Post,
in Wittels, What Can We Do About Sex Crimes? Dec. 11, 1948.
61 Leppman, Essential Differences Between Sex Offenders (1942), 32 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 366. Also see East, Sexual Offenders-A British View (1946) 55 Yale
L.J. 527. The author states: "Among the flotsam of modern society, sexual offenders
require special consideration. To the average lawyer they represent a class of individ-
uals little known and rarely encountered. For this reason, when legal precedent alone
determines the outcome of litigation involving sexual offenders, it may be a case of
the blind leading the blind."
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The present trend of preventative legislation therefore seems particularly
well-suited to meet the problem of the sexual psychopath.
Illinois was the first state to provide valid legislation dealing with the
criminal sexual psychopathic offender in 1938. Other states have since
passed similar legislation, and a few states have extended their statutes
to include legal disposition of the individual before he has an oppor-
tunity to commit crimes. 62 The proposed act represents an attempt to
remove the administrative difficulties present in the 1938 statute,
enabling the courts to deal with a psychopath before he harms society.
It is a positive constructive approach toward meeting the menace of sex
crimes. It recognizes that many sex offenders are sick people who
should be kept out of the community until they are cured. It also
operates to confine and treat a person convicted of or charged with crime
and to keep him off the streets until he recovers from. his mental disorder.
Obviously, this bill alone will not do the job of preventing all sex
crimes. Other complementary measures such as improved and extended
sex education will have to be made a part of a much broader program.
Larger appropriations for better state mental institutions and more
well-trained, competent psychiatrists are necessary ingredients to the
successful operation of the statute. Although the new proposal makes
no pretense at being a panacean solution to the problem, it is an enlight-
ened attempt to stop sex crimes before they happen and treat sex
offenders medically once they have committed crimes. At the same time,
it is successful in preserving the basic rights and liberty of the individual.
NEwroN MIow
62 Neither Massachusetts, Minnesota, nor Wisconsin provide that a crime or a
charge thereof is necessary.
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